Plantinga on  Felix Culpa : Analysis and Critique by Adams, Marilyn McCord
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 25 Issue 2 Article 1 
4-1-2008 
Plantinga on "Felix Culpa": Analysis and Critique 
Marilyn McCord Adams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Adams, Marilyn McCord (2008) "Plantinga on "Felix Culpa": Analysis and Critique," Faith and Philosophy: 
Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 25 : Iss. 2 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol25/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
PLANTINGA ON "FELIX CULPA": 
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
Marilyn McCord Adams
In "Supralapsarianism, or 'O Felix Culpa,'" Alvin Plantinga turns from 
defensive apologetics to the project of Christian explanation and offers a 
supralapsarian theodicy: the reason God made us in a world like this is that 
God wanted to create a world including the towering goods of Incarnation 
and atonem ent-goods which are appropriate only in worlds containing a 
sufficient amount of sin, suffering, and evil as well. Plantinga's approach 
makes human agents and their sin, suffering and evil, instrumental means 
to the end of God's cosmic aims. I press the objection that means/end con­
ceptuality is inadequate to explain how God is loving and merciful (as op­
posed to abusive) towards human sinners and sufferers. Plantinga's theo­
dicy remains under-developed without an explanation of how Incarnation 
and atonement benefit them.
I. Free-Will Defender o f the Faith
In his early and middle years, Alvin Plantinga was a vigorous promoter 
and practitioner of defensive apologetics, which assumes the truth of the 
Christian faith and shoulders a limited burden of proof.1 On Plantinga's 
construal, the task of the defensive apologist is neither to demonstrate the 
truth of doctrinal tenets with arguments convincing to all reasonable per­
sons, nor to furnish explanations that would help unbelievers understand 
what Christians really mean in holding them. Rather, the assignment is to 
rebut unbeliever's arguments against the reasonableness of Christianity, 
and to do so with minimal philosophical and theological exposure.
In his book The Nature of Necessity2 and many earlier and later articles, 
Plantinga's attention was on the atheological argument from evil, which 
forwards the following inconsistent triad:
(I) God exists, and is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good.
(II) Evil exists.
(III) If (I), then not-(II).
Many atheologians insisted, (III) is a necessary truth, and concluded that 
God and evil are logically incompossible. Moving at a high level of ab­
straction, rebuttal takes the form of a credible rejection of (III). Plantinga 
explains, what the defensive apologist needs to do is to identify an R 
which is logically possible, is logically compossible with (I) and entails
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(II). So far as this logical problem of evil is concerned, R need not be true or 
even plausible either to believers or to unbelievers, so long as it meets the 
formal requirements just laid down.
Plantinga himself was especially concerned to revitalize the Free Will 
Defense, by rebutting an objection to it by J.L. Mackie. If free will defenders 
in effect proposed
R1: God created a world with incompatibilist free creatures and al­
lowed them unfettered exercize of their freedom; and some of them 
sinned,
Mackie in effect retorted that R1 is not logically compossible with (I), 
because a world with sinless free creatures is logically possible. Omnip­
otence can bring about anything that is logically possible, and perfect 
goodness would prefer sinless to sinful free creatures. Therefore, if (I), 
God would bring about a world with sinless free creatures instead.
By way of rebuttal, Plantinga imbedded his distinctive Free Will Defense 
within a possible worlds framework. God's creative activity is construed 
in terms of Divine actualization of a possible world. Implicitly assuming 
that Divine Goodness is to be defended in terms of the quality of the mega­
states of affairs God actualizes, Plantinga agrees that Divine omniscience, 
omnipotence, and perfect goodness entails that any world God actualizes 
would be a very good world. To rebut Mackie's charge that any world God 
actualized would have to contain only sinless free creatures, Plantinga 
draws on a Molinist conception of incompatibilist freedom to argue for 
the startling conclusion that there are some possible worlds that God can't 
actualize. The reason is that for every possible incompatibilist free creature 
S, considered as merely possible, there are not only necessary truths about 
that creature's possible choices—e.g., Adam chooses to eat the apple in W, 
Adam chooses not to eat the apple in W'. In addition, for every possible in- 
compatibilist free creature S, and for every circumstance C in which S could 
be actualized, there are contingent truths about what that agent S would do 
if actualized in C: e.g., Adam would choose to eat if actual in Eden, Adam 
would not choose to eat if actual in Shangrila. These "counter-factuals of 
freedom" are supposed—by Plantinga—to be true not only prior to and 
independently of the actual existence and actual choices of the incompatibil­
ist free creatures, but also prior to and independently of Divine choice. As 
such, they are fates (although Plantinga does not use the term), which—like 
necessary truths—God has to work with, and they restrict God's options. 
God consults which choice patterns the fates make available and then actu­
alizes free creatures in the state of affairs that will issue in scenarios congru­
ent with Divine purposes. Where worlds containing incompatibilist free 
creatures are concerned, which world is actual is a function of the state of 
affairs God actualizes on God's own (of which state of affairs God strongly 
actualizes) and the fates (which God does not control), and so Plantinga 
speaks of God's weakly actualizing the possible world as a whole.
With this philosophical machinery in hand, Plantinga proposes that 
it is logically possible that all possible incompatibilist free creatures are 
transworld depraved: that no matter what circumstance God decided to 
actualize them in, they would go wrong at least once. Plantinga's candi­
date for R is some version of
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R2: God actualizes a very good world containing incompatibilist free 
creatures each of whom goes wrong at least once—a world that 
displays the most favorable balance of moral good over moral evil, 
God can get.
Plantinga insists, R2 is compatible with (I) and entails (II). The Free Will 
Defense is triumphant after all!
II. Felix Culpa! and Christian Understanding
In his middle and more recent years, Plantinga has made room for the 
complementary project of Christian understanding; in his "Supralapsari- 
anism, or 'O Felix Culpa,'" (I'll call it "Felix Culpa" for short), he ventures 
from defense into theodicy.3 Cast in terms of his older framework, he is 
now interested in identifying an R that not only has the requisite for­
mal properties—of being logically possible, logically compossible with 
(I), and entailing (II). He wants an R that will carry some explanatory 
weight with Christians, that will help Christians to understand why an 
omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God—Plantinga now inter­
prets, a God Who is loving and merciful4—would create us in a world 
like this. To do this work, Plantinga's new R will have to be one that 
Christians believe to be true, or at least plausible, a coherent and sugges­
tive extension of the beliefs and understandings that they already hold. 
As a by-product, the new R should help non-Christians understand one 
way that Christians might coherently hold (I) to be logically compossible 
with (II).
In "Felix Culpa," Plantinga sticks to his possible worlds framework, 
still characterizes Divine creation in terms of world actualization, still 
sets Divine evaluative sights on mega states of affairs. As before, Plantin­
ga holds fast to his Molinism, however contestible and widely contested 
it has proved to be. (Certainly, I would contest it, but—like Plantinga—I 
forego old and familiar disputes to focus on fresher things.) As before, 
Plantinga concludes, it follows from (I) Divine omniscience, omnipo­
tence, and perfect goodness that any world God actualizes would be a 
very good world. Mega states of affairs have many good-making and/ 
or bad-making features (beauty and happiness and justice and perfor­
mance of duty versus pain and suffering and hatred and wrong-doing) 
that most people—unbelievers as well as believers—would recognize as 
such.5 In "Felix Culpa," however, Plantinga is especially eager to draw 
attention to some Christian value-commitments that erstwhile (because 
now deceased and—Christians believe—better informed) atheologians 
like Mackie did not share: most notably, to the existence of God, to the 
good that God is; and to the fact of the Incarnation and atonement.6 Fo­
cussing first on the good that God is, and without putting too fine a point 
on it, Plantinga speaks of Divine goodness as "unlimited" or "infinite" 
or "incommensurate," which mean at least that the good that God is out­
weighs any aggregate of merely created goods or evils.7 Plantinga goes 
on to infer,
Corollary 1: any world in which God exists is ipso facto a very good 
world, whether or not it contains any creatures.8
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And since, necessarily, if God actualizes a world, God exists in that world,
Corollary 2 : any possible world that God could create is a very good 
world.
Further, since—many Christian philosophers would agree-(I) is a neces­
sary truth—God's existence, omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect good­
ness are necessary,
Corollary 3 : any possible world is a very good world.9
The problem posed by evil for believing Christians is not that it disproves 
the existence of God. Rather, given Corollaries 1-3, and given God's nec­
essary existence, omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect goodness, the 
problem is to understand how this can be a very good world given evils 
in the amounts and of the kinds and with the distributions that we ac­
tually experience. Put otherwise, the swamping effect of infinite Divine 
goodness on global values, does not make what else the world contains 
irrelevant for Christian understanding of how God can be good or loving 
towards His personal creatures. For Plantinga, as for the great medieval 
theologians, part of the explanation lies in God's posture towards the evils 
and God's posture towards us! In "Felix Culpa," Plantinga does recognize 
"imaginable or conceivable worlds" (presumably in the sense of being 
worlds free from internal contradiction) that are so bad that God would 
not actualize them (e.g., worlds in which all sensient creatures experience 
continual and unrelieved excruciating pain).10
Turning to the "towering" goods of Incarnation and atonement, Plant- 
inga endorses
The Strong Value Assumption: there is a level L of excellence or good­
ness among possible worlds such that all the worlds at that level or 
above contain Incarnation and atonement,
which implies that any world at or above L is a highly eligible world. 
Plantinga conducts his argument on the basis of the Strong Value assump­
tion, but he thinks it would work as well on
The Moderate Value Assumption: for families of possible worlds con­
taining the same free creatures, the worlds in which those creatures 
sin but are offered redemption through Incarnation and atonement 
are better than the worlds in which those same free creatures are 
sinless and need no redemption,
which—he says—does not entail that every world with Incarnation and 
atonement is better than every world without them, and does not entail 
that there is a level L such that every world at or above it contains Incarna­
tion and atonement.11 Suppose that the worlds in family F  contain n free 
creatures, while the worlds in family F* contain 10n free creatures. On the 
Moderate Value Assumption, it is possible that the better F* worlds with 
10n free creatures but no Incarnation and atonement, exceed the value 
of any of the F  worlds. Incarnation and atonement might trump within 
families, without trumping tout court.
Plantinga seems to over-reach himself when he suggests that his argu­
ment requires only
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The Weak Value Assumption: some possible worlds of great value in­
clude Incarnation and atonement.
One problem is that the Weak Value Assumption not only differs from, but 
is compatible with the following inversion of the Moderate Value Assump­
tion: viz., that for every world in which creatures sin and are redeemed 
through Incarnation and atonement, there is another even better world in 
which those same free creatures exist but never sin at all. And, as we are 
about to see, the argument that Plantinga actually gives turns on claiming 
that within the relevant class of world options, sin, Incarnation, and atone­
ment confer greater global value.12
If the "very-goodness" contributed by the existence of God is a constant, 
value comparisons among worlds will focus on the rest of what they in­
clude. The Strong Value Assumption says that Incarnation and atonement 
will get any world up to a level-L, which is greater than that of any world 
that does not contain them, and every possible world that does contain 
them is at level-L or above. So Plantinga's new candidate for R is
R3: God creates a level-L or above world that contains the Incarnation 
and atonement.13
But Atonement is not appropriate apart from a sufficient amount of sin, 
suffering, and evil. Felix culpa, because human sin is a necessary condition 
for any possible world's being at level L or above. Plantinga contends, R3 
is itself logically possible, logically compossible with (I), and entails (II). 
Moreover, R3 explains to Christians, in terms of characteristically Chris­
tian beliefs and concepts, why God would create us in a world like this. 
God creates us in a world with sin and suffering and evil, because God 
wants to create a level-L or above world, one that contains Incarnation 
and atonement! Plantinga concludes that this would constitute a success­
ful theodicy.14
III. Supra- vs Infralapsarianism
Historically, the terminology 'supra-' vs 'infralapsarian' (above and be­
low the fall, respectively) gets introduced into a debate about Divine 
predestination. Which comes first? Does God first foresee Adam's fall 
(human sin) and then (on the basis of that knowledge) divide Adam's 
fallen race into those predestined to eternal blessedness in heaven and 
those reprobated to suffer eternal torments in hell? Or does God first 
partition the human race into the heaven-bound and the hell-bent, and 
then furnish and withhold helps of grace so that individual human ca­
reers are congruent with their pre-established destinies? Historically, the 
issue is the ordering of foreseen sin and eternal destiny assignment. Appar­
ently wishing to finesse the question of double predestination, Plantinga 
reformulates the contrast as about the ordering of permission to sin and 
decision to save:
According to supralapsarianism, the decree to save some of the 
fallen precedes the decree to permit sin; according to infralapsari­
anism, it's the other way around.15
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Plantinga rightly reckons that the kind of priority in question is priority 
of intention: the contrast is between ultimate ends (what is first intended) 
and proximate ends or chosen means (what is intended for the sake of the 
ultimate end). Plantinga concludes, according to R3, the supra's have it.16
Even if Divine focus is global and what God chooses to actualize is a 
possible world as a whole, Plantinga recognizes that certain good-making 
and bad-making features within a world may furnish the reason for Divine 
choice. Thus, in his earlier distinctive Free Will Defense, God's ultimate aim 
is a very good world whose incompatibilist free creatures compile moral 
records with the most favorable balance of moral goodness over moral evil 
that the fates (the counterfactuals of freedom) allow.17 Incompatibilist free 
creatures exercizing significant freedom to do right, is part of God's ulti­
mate aim. Their each going wrong at least once is a regrettable price God 
has to pay because of the way the fates fall out. "Felix culpa!" is not God's 
reaction, because—early and middle Plantinga still concedes to Mackie, at 
least for the sake of argument—God would actualize a world with sinless 
free creatures if God could. Plantinga's earlier Free Will Defense does not 
mention Incarnation and atonement at all, but relies on the "very goodness" 
conferred on the world by free creatures' moral records; after all, he was do­
ing defensive, minimal-exposure apologetics. Nevertheless, the reader is 
left to think that the earlier Free Will Defense is infralapsarian.
By contrast, Plantinga's analysis in "Felix Culpa" is supralapsarian. 
God's ultimate aim is an L-level world, one that contains Incarnation and 
atonement. Sin, suffering and evil are proximate ends or chosen means. 
The decree to provide Incarnation and atonement and hence salvation is 
prior to the decree to permit the fall into sin, not the other way around.18 
Plantinga goes further to explain: if sin, suffering, and evil are necessary 
for atonement, and Incarnation and atonement are necessary for a level-L 
world, then Christ's suffering will not be sufficient for a level-L world; 
human suffering—he should have added, sin and evil—will be required 
as well. He commends this as a perfectly good sense in which our suffer­
ings fill up the sufferings of Christ (Col 1:24).19
This contrast does not mean that Plantinga's two proposals are them­
selves incompatible. The Free Will Defense is a piece of defensive apolo­
getics, which aims to defend the logical compossibility of (I) and (II). R2 
is advanced, not as true or plausible, but as logically possible. By contrast, 
"Felix Culpa" aims at theodicy, and its R3 is proposed as true. Since what 
is at stake is the contingent ordering of Divine intentions, Infralapsarian- 
ism could be possible even if Supralapsarianism were true, indeed—as 
Plantinga claims—a true theodicy. What would be incompatible with 
Plantinga's "Felix Culpa" Supralapsarianism, would be to continue to 
grant—with Mackie—that 'A perfectly good God would create a world 
with sinless free creatures in preference to a world with sinful ones, if God 
could' is a necessary truth, or—relative to the actual world—a truth at all.
IV. Means and Ends
Using or Abusing? Possible worlds are mega states of affairs. Possible worlds 
approaches to the problem of evil easily slide into a consequentialist as­
sumption: that because agents are to be evaluated in terms of the states of
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affairs they bring about, it is enough to defend Divine goodness by point­
ing to the laudable overall qualities of the possible world God actualizes 
(e.g., that it is the best of all possible worlds; that it is a world with the 
most favorable balance of moral good over moral evil the fates allow; that 
it exhibits maximum variety and maximum unity). Especially from a Chris­
tian point of view, however, it is important to distinguish between what 
I have called God's "global" goodness, or goodness at cosmos production, 
from God's "person-oriented" goodness—to the individual persons God cre­
ates. Certainly, the bible represents God as interested in cosmic excellence 
(cf. Gen 1), but it also tells of God's love and mercy towards individual 
created persons. Since positively valued organic wholes (such as many 
possible worlds arguably are) can contain negatively valued parts that 
enhance cosmic excellence, going for a high degree of cosmic excellence 
would not guarantee individual personal well-being. Just as a blob of ugly 
billious green might be necessary to produce Monet's exquisite design, so 
horrendous suffering by created persons might be a necessary ingredient 
in (a constitutive means to) the best of all possible worlds. Already Leibniz 
was criticized: to represent God as someone Who would accept the Lis­
bon earthquake as the price of getting the best of all possible worlds, is 
to portray God as so focussed on maximizing world-excellence as not to 
care much about the created persons God has made!20 But Plantinga's "Fe­
lix Culpa" theodicy explicitly makes created sin, suffering, and evil to be 
necessary Divinely chosen means to actualizing a level-L or above world 
(God's ultimate aim). Plantinga even makes the unKantian observation that 
"not all rational creatures are equal with respect to value, i.e., to the value 
of the worlds in which they exist."21 Isn't Plantinga's God just using created 
persons, treating them to their detriment as means to Divine cosmic ends? 
However Plantinga may commend Divine excellence at world-making, 
doesn't his theodicy undermine any claim that God is loving or merciful, 
good-to the persons involved?
Plantinga considers this objection, and has the courage of his convic­
tions. His Moderate Value assumption would have God choosing between 
two families of worlds that include exactly the same created persons: in 
one family of worlds, the created persons are all sinless and free from 
suffering and evil and so need no redemption; while in the other fam­
ily of worlds, they sin, experience suffering and evil, and are rescued by 
Incarnation and atonement. God actualizes those free creatures in careers 
that include sin, suffering, and evil, when God could have spared them 
such troubles. God doesn't, because God is using them and their suffer- 
ing—Plantinga should have added, sin and evil—as means to the Divine 
cosmic end of actualizing a higher quality world.22
Confronting the charge that it is morally objectionable (in any event, 
incompatible with Divine goodness, love, and mercy) for God to use cre­
ated persons, that this would be to treat them as means rather than ends, 
Plantinga construes the issue as one of fairness or justice. His bold retort 
is, "what's wrong with that?"23 It isn't always wrong for people to treat 
one another as means: employers treat employees as means to the end of 
getting the job done, and employees treat employers as means to the end 
of earning a living. God is the owner of the world's vineyard. Why should 
God not treat created persons as laborers?24
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Scanning for disanalogies that would motivate the objection, Plantinga 
fixes on two. The first is the issue of "free and voluntary consent." To 
many, it seems wrong to impose harms on persons without their free and 
voluntary consent. Employers freely offer; employees freely take the job, 
thereby "signing a consent form" for any hardships it involves. But
God doesn't ask for our permission before creating us, before actu­
alizing this world in which we are called upon to suffer. We don't 
accept the suffering voluntarily; we don't get a choice . . . isn't that 
somehow unfair?25
Second, the employees get something out of the arrangment: wages. In the 
"Felix Culpa" scenario as Plantinga has so far described it, God calls on us 
to live out careers of sin, suffering, and evil, for the world's sake, for the 
sake of Divine purposes. Nothing has yet been said about these careers ad­
vancing the creatures' good or well-being—which is what person-centered 
goodness, love or mercy toward individual creatures would require.26
Consent, How Relevant? Plantinga is clear, God has no obligation not to 
use us. God is entitled to do what God wants with what is God's own. 
(With this claim, I, for one, would surely agree.) For Plantinga (as for me), 
the issue is whether God would be unloving or unmerciful in actualizing 
us in careers in which we live through significantly bad experiences that 
do not benefit us, without our consent. Plantinga observes that—given 
his Molinist, possible worlds framework for Divine decision making—it 
is logically impossible for God to get our consent prior to Divine selec­
tion of which world to actualize. In moral reasoning, what we do (e.g., 
in medical ethics dilemmas) when the agent is unable to consent (as with 
the comatose) is consider whether they would consent if they could. Since 
God knows all of the counterfactuals of freedom, God would know the 
answer to such questions. Still, the person's own preferences are not al­
ways decisive even with those who love him/her. Sometimes a person is 
unwilling only because of ignorance, but would consent if s/he knew all of 
the relevant facts. It would not count against our goodness towards such 
a person to override their refusal and proceed in such a case. Other times 
a person is unwilling because of disordered affections. Plantinga mentions 
the loving mothers who drag their eight year olds kicking and screaming 
to piano lessons, because the children (whose agency is still immature) 
don't know what's good for them. By the time we finish the list, it seems 
that God is not unloving or unmerciful to act without our consent, be­
cause what's relevant is not what we personally would agree to, but what 
"an ideal consenter" with full knowledge and perfectly ordered affections 
would choose. And God knows what that is, in advance of Divine deci­
sions about which world to actualize.
The question about consent arose from worries about God's person- 
centered goodness towards us in using us as means to getting a level-L 
world. Plantinga's blunt "what's wrong with that?" response, his insis­
tence that it is not always morally objectionable to use people as means, is 
probably congruent with Kant's famous formulation of the maxim: "don't 
treat people as means only and not as ends in themselves!" The Kantian
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point is that there are moral constraints on how we use each other and 
for what ends we use each other. It is morally permissible to do so, only 
in ways that respect the dignity and worth of one another's personhood. 
Roughly speaking, that means employment, but not slavery; employment, 
but for fair wages and under decent working conditions; employment that 
does not set others to tasks that put them at avoidable, unacknowledged, 
and/or uncompensated risk of great bodily harm, to tasks under condi­
tions almost sure to make them morally worse, mentally deficient, and/or 
to result in their psycho-spiritual undoing. It means that we are not mor­
ally in the clear to hire the "hit" man to do our moral dirty work, nor to 
put people under pressure to betray their deepest loyalties. In short, it is 
not morally permissible to use one another in ways that are degrading or 
depersonalizing.
The further Kantian point is that moral permission is denied for this, 
whether or not the person consents to being used in this way. Hearkening back 
to Plantinga's own criteria, persons who consent to being used in ways 
very likely to be degrading and depersonalizing, thereby furnish prima 
facie evidence that they do not really know what they are doing (they 
are ignorant of some choice-relevant factors) and/or that that they are 
"crazy" (more soberly, that their affections are disordered in some way). 
Even if we agree that God is not subject to moral obligations not to use 
us, how could God be loving and merciful towards persons that God uses 
in such ways?
Atonement, A Towering Valuable? Central to Plantinga's "Felix Culpa" 
theodicy is his contention that Divine Incarnation and atonement are an 
"unthinkably great," "towering and magnificent" good, an unrivalled 
display of love.27 Evidently, Plantinga assumes that this judgment will 
be uncontroversial among Christians, because he is content to speak of 
Incarnation and atonement together and to leave the biblical language 
through which he references them unanalyzed (apart from the Lutheran 
interpretation that Christ on the cross experienced Himself as abandoned 
by the Father).28 Since the very propriety of "Felix Culpa" Supralapsarian- 
ism turns on it, we should pause to examine it.
In fact, as the great medieval theologians recognized, Incarnation and 
atonement are logically independent: all agreed, it would have been meta­
physically or logically possible for God to become Incarnate, even if crea­
tures had never sinned; and Incarnation without atonement would still 
have been cosmic excellence enhancing.29 Except for some nineteenth cen­
tury kenotic views, the immeasurable value of the Incarnate One should 
be easy to grant, because the Divine Word is no less God, despite Incarna­
tion.30 In the middle ages, hypostatic union was viewed as a further valu­
able, albeit the finite one of a created relation relating a created nature to 
the Divine Word.31
Atonement is more difficult, and here it helps to distinguish the ge­
neric value of the act-type (truth-telling, almsgiving vs stealing, lying, 
and cheating) from the value of the act-token. Good act tokens require the 
performance of an action of a generically good act type by the right person 
at the right time and place and in the right manner. Problems with the 
act-types Plantinga's traditional language attributes to God the Father—a
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father's putting his son in the position of sacrificing his life for less re­
lated and undeserving others; a person in authority requiring the inno­
cent to suffer for the guilty—are ancient and honorable and often wrestled 
with. They need not detain us here except to record that their positive 
value has not seemed self-evident to Christians, but rather a candidate 
for theological explanation of the sort that theodicy is supposed to pro­
vide. The act-types attributed to the Son—voluntarily sacrificing oneself 
for the good of others, voluntarily standing up for what is true and right 
at whatever cost—are generically good. But for the token to be good, there 
has to be a situation where such sacrifice is appropriate. Otherwise, the 
deed will be foolish or quixotic. "Felix Culpa" Supralapsarianism adds 
another act-type to the soteriological drama: deliberately putting some in 
a position that will require rescue by others. Plantinga admits, this looks 
like a generically bad, indeed psychologically perverse act type—like the 
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy,
too much like a father who throws his children into the river so that
he can then heroically rescue them, or a doctor who first spreads a
horrifying disease so that he can then display enormous virtue in
fighting it in heroic disregard of his own safety and fatigue.32
Why is Plantinga's Supralapsarian "Felix Culpa" God not a cosmic child 
abuser, however within Divine rights an obligationless God necessarily 
remains?
Compensating Benefits? Plantinga is not altogether insensitive to, but 
clearly remains puzzled by objections to God's choosing us into careers 
in which we suffer many and great ills for the world's sake, and for the 
sake of God's cosmic, level-L or above, aspirations. Plantinga rejects as too 
general Eleonore Stump's idea that a loving God (or parent) would impose 
only those sufferings that were necessary for the sufferer's own good. Per­
haps Plantinga is thinking that God is within Divine rights to cause us to 
suffer for other reasons. Perhaps he also reckons (with Hick) that a little 
altruism—e.g., suffering skinned knees or mumps or measles or lost soc­
cer matches for the world's sake—might be good for our souls!33
Where suffering is concerned, Plantinga does go further. Treading the 
deep waters of the Pauline epistles, of Calvinist and other spiritual writers, 
Plantinga brings out their proposals for how suffering can have instrumen­
tal value for the sufferer. Not only does suffering offer Hicksian opportu­
nities for character development. Not only is some suffering consequent 
upon the instrumental value to us of natural regularities (as Swinburne 
and Van Inwagen34 maintain). St. Paul suggests that our suffering is a soli­
darity with Christ in His suffering, a way of coming to be more Christlike, 
a means to attaining the resurrection from the dead (2 Cor 4:10-11,14; Phil 
3:10-11) and to bearing an eternal weight of glory beyond the grave (2 
Cor 4:17). Jonathan Edwards suggests that by virtue of our fall and subse­
quent redemption we can achieve a level of intimacy with God that can't 
be reached any other way, one that brings us into "the charmed circle" of 
the Trinity itself. Julian of Norwich predicts that we will experience Divine 
gratitude for our suffering.35
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On the strength of these testimonies, Plantinga ventures that such fu­
ture benefits are so great, that a really mature Christian might welcome the 
opportunity to suffer in advance (like the keen student who signs up for 
grueling hours in the lab or library for the sake of intellectual discoveries; 
or the eager athlete who subjects him/herself to punishing training rigors 
in order to beat the record or win the race), while the rest of us sufferers 
might be glad of it in retrospect (like the adult who is after all glad to have 
had the piano lessons s/he resisted in childhood).36
V. Wrecked and Ruined Agencies
Damned or Damnable? The idea that really mature Christians would be 
willing to sacrifice their own well-being for God's sake, is ancient and hon­
orable and recurrent. In the midst of the 16th and 17th century pure love 
controversy, Fenelon argued that if one's love for God were pure—if one 
loved God with all one's heart, soul, strength, and mind—then one would 
will only that God's will be done. Fenelon drew the conclusion that one 
should be willing to be damned for the glory of God!
Notable for present purposes is that Fenelon is talking about a special 
case of agents with high levels of integrity, whose personality is so orga­
nized around the love of God above all and for God's own sake, that they 
would not draw back from any use God wanted to make of them. Fenelon 
envisions consenting—like early Christian martyrs—to deprivations and 
torments that do not violate the personal core, but leave loyalties and 
commitments intact. Likewise notable is the fact that the Roman Catholic 
church condemned Fenelon's conclusion, partly in the face of arguments 
by Bossuet that loving God above all and for God's own sake would entail 
a good and right desire for fellowship with God—which is the opposite 
of damnation.37
Plantinga's "Felix Culpa" is non-committal about double predestina­
tion, except to identify it as one of the "sterner" forms of Calvinism.38 What 
"Felix Culpa" Supralapsarian does commit him to is something at least as 
daunting: Plantinga's "Felix Culpa" God calls on individual created per­
sons to be or become agents who are not and cannot be pleasing to God 
according to the criteria published by the bible and the Christian religion! 
Remember, this time Plantinga is offering a theodicy, which is supposed to 
explain to Christians, not just some evils or other, some sins or other, but 
the kinds of evils and sins, the wrecked and ruined agents that we actually 
find. Look around, read the papers, revisit the history books: Plantinga's 
"Felix Culpa" God calls on many of us to be or become—whether or not 
damned—damnable, for the sake of an level-L or above world.
Although it is sin that atonement most obviously presupposes, Plant- 
inga gives the category of sinners short shrift, perhaps because he is still 
thinking that sinning is their own incompatibilist free choice, and cre­
ated incompatibilist free choices are not something God causes. Thus, 
he re-emphasizes how it is not the capacity for some incompatibilist free 
choices or other (e.g., to choose the blue pencil over the red one), but 
for morally significant incompatibilist free choices that is so cosmic-value 
enhancing. "[C]reatures that have a great deal of power, including power 
to do both good and evil," to oppose God and obstruct Divine purposes,
"are more valuable than creatures who are free, but whose power is lim­
ited or meager."39
This cuts no theodical ice, however, because Plantinga's "Felix Culpa" 
Supralapsarianism has God decide on what careers incompatibilist free 
creatures will have prior in the order of explanation to their existence. 
Once again, for Plantinga, incompatibilist free creatures, considered as 
merely possible, are not "truth-makers" for the counter-factuals of free­
dom about them. On Plantinga's Strong Value assumption, God is aiming 
for a level-L-or-above world. God consults the fates and identifies states 
of affairs the strong actualization of which will achieve Divine purposes. 
That individual created persons are sinners is predestined, because it is 
settled by the fates and by Divine choice "before the foundation of the 
earth." Plantinga's Moderate Value assumption explicitly has God choos­
ing among alternative careers for the same individuals. On Plantinga's 
"Felix Culpa" Supralapsarianism, God's choice of which state of affairs 
to strongly actualize—without ever having to cause our choices—does us 
out of sinless lives and chooses us into the agencies that we actually have. 
Sober confrontation with these evokes the question, whether God has not 
seriously harmed many of us thereby?
Consider a category that cuts across sin and suffering: the category of 
wrecked and ruined human agency—agency that is hardened and per­
verted (Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot are only lurid examples), agency that is 
biochemically twisted (serial killers, child sex murderers, schizophrenics), 
agency that is biologically or psychologically too fragmented (whether by 
autism or the traumas of child abuse and war) to be capable of whole­
hearted commitment to anything. Plantinga's "Felix Culpa" God chose for 
Pharaoh the career in which repeated heart-hardenings rain ruin on the 
land of Egypt; for Judas, the career in which he betrays Christ; for the 
Gospel Pharisees and Sadducees, the careers in which they betray their 
deepest purpose by killing the Messiah Whose way they worked so scru­
pulously to prepare. We know, in the bible Pharaoh's resistance advances 
the cause of Israel's exodus and YHWH's glory; Judas and Jesus' estab­
lishment enemies all forward the ever ironic plot towards crucifixion and 
resurrection. But how does God, in assigning them such vocations, show 
Godhead to be loving and merciful to them?
If it is mysterious how excruciating back pain might prepare one for an 
eternal weight of glory or make one better suited for Trinitarian intimacy 
(I am not denying that it does), it is incredible that such wrecked and 
ruined agency has instrumental value for the created agents themselves. 
That's what we mean by 'wrecked' and 'ruined'! These are conditions that 
do not advance, but drastically retard the soul-making process. Would 
it be a sign of disordered affections, not to consent to becoming a God- 
hater, a people-hater, a mass murderer, a Christ-betrayer, a God-killer? 
a person so shattered as to be incapable of the integrity God commands? 
What more would a rational agent under the Rawlsian veil of ignorance 
have to know, to decline the opportunity to be actualized in such a world? 
Would not even a Christian of Fenelonian maturity balk at the idea of 
owning such an agency, just so that God could actualize an L-level or 
above world? Would not the double-bind—of God's commanding us to 
be the opposite of what God has otherwise commanded—show that God
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does, after all, hate some of the people God has made? Nor would these 
worries be alleviated by appeal to the fates, by the suggestion that maybe 
the counter-factuals of freedom fall out in such a way that God could not 
make us in better careers. For Divine love and mercy to created persons 
is not adequately defended, much less explained, by the observation that 
God couldn't do better for them. One has to argue in addition that the ca­
reers they have are not so bad that—as Matthew says of Judas—it would 
have been better for them never to have existed at all (Mt 26:24)!
In "Felix Culpa," Plantinga does not make unmistakeably clear wheth­
er he thinks Divine goodness-to (love and mercy towards) created per­
sons is universal. Certainly, the ends of Incarnation and atonement most 
easily rationalize a world that includes only sinners who get redeemed; 
others would be a waste, so far as those ends are concerned, although the 
fates might make strict economy de facto impossible. More to the point, 
Plantinga's reticence about double predestination suggests that he is still 
a minimal-exposurist who would like his "Felix Culpa" Supralapsarian- 
ism to be compatible with either option—universal salvation, or divided 
destinies after all. To complete our analysis, we ought briefly to explore 
(as Plantinga does not) whether what he does say suggests any ways to 
develop his position to make that neutrality possible.
Compensating Damages? Plantinga explained Divine goodness-to suffer­
ers in terms of the instrumental value of their suffering in producing some 
compensating benefit for them. If wreck and ruin have no instrumental 
value for wrecked and ruined agents, compensating benefit would have to 
be responsive and corrective and involve healing, a remolding and remak­
ing of agency in radical ways. To be sure, this kind of Divine tampering 
with created agency is something Free Will Defenders have usually seen 
as a violation of the created agent's autonomy: God—they say—should 
not reach in and turn the wills of those who reject God, even if that means 
annihilation or eternal torment for them. Plantinga's own Free Will De­
fense made no such protests about Divine interference, but rather spoke 
abstractly of incompatibilist free creatures excercizing significant freedom 
to compile moral track records. In any event, we have already seen how 
Plantinga's "Felix Culpa" theodicy does not put a high priority on the 
actual consent of created persons: what they would personally choose is 
not decisive, but can be trumped by what an "ideal consenter" would 
choose instead. Moreover, radical agency-healing would not have to be 
"twinkling of an eye" instantaneous and hence introduce drastic psycho­
spiritual discontinuities. It could involve a long therapeutic process, with 
many opportunities for the agent to participate and learn to cooperate 
along the way.
Divine goodness-to actual wrecked or ruined agents surely will have to 
involve healing transformation and conversion. But would this be enough 
to save Divine love and mercy to wrecked and ruined agents, according to 
Plantinga's "Felix Culpa" Supralapsarian plot? How should we assess the 
attitude of a God Who predestines us to be ante-mortem Hitlers or child sex 
murderers as a means to the end of an L-level world, but tries to make it up to 
us by turning us into St. Francis or St. Clare in the life to come? Isn't this too 
much like the wife-beater who jekyl-hydes between Monday-Wednesday-
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Friday blows and Tuesday-Thursday-Saturday chocolates and roses? Would 
Fenelonian heroes and heroines of faith be wrong to refuse such an offer?
VI. Neglected Disvalues, Mistaken Connections
The Meaning o f Horrors. My worries about Plantinga's "Felix Culpa" theo­
dicy can be focussed in another—coming from me, unsurprizing—way: it 
shows an insufficient appreciation of the category of horrors. In my earlier 
books and articles,40 I have defined "horrors" as "evils participating in the 
doing or suffering of which constitutes prima facie reason to believe the 
participant's life cannot be a great good to him/her on the whole and in the 
end." Horrors are prima facie life ruinous, person destroying, because they 
threaten to swallow up the positive meaning of the participant's life. Hor­
rendous evils positively litter the actual world. Why God would make us 
radically vulnerable to horrors in a world such as this, and how God can 
be good to us even though we participate in them, are questions a credible 
Christian theodicy must face.
Any solution to the problem of horrors will have to argue that horrors 
can be rightly recontextualized by relation to a great enough good. But 
since what is at stake is personal meaning and the personal relationships 
between God and human beings, not just any sort of connection between 
the evil and the greater good will serve. Standard moves in formulating 
and solving the philosophical problem of evil converge on instrumental 
"means/end" conceptuality: they agree that an omniscient, omnipotent, 
and perfectly good God would not cause or permit evils except as a neces­
sary means to some greater good or to avoiding some worse evil. Plantin- 
ga's "Felix Culpa" theodicy applies this notion twiceover: human careers 
of sin, suffering, and evil are instrumentally necessary (necessary means) 
for God's chosen end; and human suffering is instrumentally necessary for 
benefits for the sufferer her/himself.
The trouble is that horrors do not have instrumental value for the 
horror participant. Imposing prima facie personal ruin is not a way to be 
good-to or to benefit anyone. Among human beings, it is morally wrong 
to perpetrate horrors on one another as a means to the end of some collec­
tive good. Even if God has no obligations to be good-to created persons, 
God would still be unloving and unmerciful to any individuals whose 
horror participation God embraced merely as a means to some cosmos­
enhancing end.
Plantinga's "Felix Culpa" Supralapsarian plot assigns a meaning to our 
horrors that deepens the horror participant's problem by explaining that 
God's attitude towards him/her is as bad or worse than s/he feared. Plant­
inga's supplementary suggestion—that suffering has instrumental value 
for the sufferer—is intended to meet this anxiety. Eleonore Stump has the 
same intention when she assures us that God permits only such suffering 
as is necessary for our own good. This idea brings horror participants to 
the verge of despair: if I am by nature the kind of person who cannot be 
benefited without being prima facie ruined, then I am a cursed kind of thing 
indeed. Likewise, if I am the kind of thing that (in the phrase of Dallas 
Willard) has to be tortured into beatitude. If human beings are the kind of 
thing that cannot be prepared for glory, who cannot get a good view of the
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Trinity or enter into intimate fellowship with the Divine persons without 
being prima facie ruined, then the question becomes urgent: doesn't God 
prove unloving and unmerciful in creating human beings at all?
My own conclusion is that means/end connections between greater 
goods and the worst evils (the ones I have identified as horrors) do 
not help the project of Christian theodicy. There need to be meaning- 
connections of another kind. Where horrors are concerned, it won't be 
enough to suggest—as Plantinga does—that the greater good outweighs 
the evil either. For precisely because horrors threaten to take away the 
possibility of positive personal meaning, they require recontextualizing 
to confer some positive meaning upon them. Mere balancing off does 
not do that: the sequencing of the unpleasant hour in the dentist's chair 
and the ravishing concert in the evening, may add up to a good day; but 
the goodness of the concert does not rub off on the experience with the 
dentist to make it somehow good.
Happily, there are other types of relations. In the apocalyptic theology 
of the bible, the faithful are urged on to endure horrors because heav­
enly bliss awaits them as a reward. In the book of Maccabees, the seven 
brothers are publicly butchered and fried for refusing to eat pork, but they 
remain confident that God will vindicate them in the resurrection. Jesus 
endures the cross (a ritually cursed death that cuts Him off from the peo­
ple of God and defeats His Messianic pretensions), despising the shame, 
and God raises Him up! Here the point is not that humans are the kind of 
thing that have to be prima facie ruined to be fit for heaven, but that hostile 
conditions may impose horrors as the price of loyalty. The suffering has 
positive meaning because it proves the martyr's loyalty and is recognized 
and honored by God.
Elsewhere, I have argued that what gives positive meaning to horror 
participants' lives is that God's primary aim in creation is Divine solidarity 
with us in a material world such as this. Divine identification with us in 
horror participation (most notably, through Incarnation and crucifixion) 
weaves up our horror participation into our overall—on the whole and 
in the end—beatific relationship with God. This does not reduce to the 
abuse of blows alternating with chocolate and roses for two reasons. First, 
because—if God's creation of us in a world such as this does expose us 
to horrors—God does not—like the spouse-beater—directly and deliber­
ately perpetrate individual horrors. Second, because God shares the cost 
by exposing Godself to horrors. God is no White House executive pushing 
paper and making speeches; God is down in the trenches sharing the hor­
rors with us! This does not make horror participation a necessary means 
to beatific intimacy with God, because even those who escape individual 
ante-mortem horror participation will likewise enter into a relationship 
with God that is incommensurately good for them. Rather going to hell 
and back with God is one shape that an overall beatific intimate relation­
ship with God can take.41
For Plantinga to work out his own version of what positive meaning 
God could confer on human horror participation—whether as victims 
or perpetrators, as wrecked and ruined agents—he would have to make 
explicit what is involved in atonement and how it might remedy the hor­
ror participants' condition. It would not be enough for him to join Hick
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and me in universalism (something he does not do in "Felix Culpa"). 
A theodicy would need to sketch out how horror participants can still 
be winners. By leaving horrors dangling, Platinga has not completed the 
explanatory task.
Ignorant Refusal, Compelling Consent. A "Felix Culpa" Supralapsarian 
might protest that such explanations are unnecessary, because we would 
consent to whatever God wanted if we were fully informed. What ac­
counts for our refusal, our miscalculations of what might be reasonable to 
accept, is ignorance of a special kind. Not ignorance of what it would be 
like to be a wrecked and ruined agent. Some of us experience that from the 
inside and know it all too well. Not propositional ignorance of what we 
might read in textbooks. But experiential ignorance of the immeasurable 
good that God is, a lack of knowledge of the sort St. Paul had when he was 
caught up into the seventh heaven, the sort that Polycarp and Perpetua 
and Felicity had that made it easy for them to consent to horrors in the 
Roman arenas, all for Christ's sake. Their reports suggest that the bigness 
of the Goodness is compelling; in the face of It, one would not be able to, 
one would not want to deny God any request. (I, for one, do not doubt 
that this is so.)
From a Christian point of view, however, there could be more than one 
explanation of this. It could be that vivid encounter with the bigness of the 
Goodness carries the conviction that Plantinga more than once hints at in 
his article and that I have urged in my books: that God would not subject 
us to excruciating suffering, by extension that God would not call on us 
to be wrecked and ruined agents, without compensating us for it, without 
guaranteeing us a life that will be a great good to us on the whole and in 
the end, not least because our horror participation will be defeated by 
Christ and we will be drawn up into deep and satisfying intimacy with the 
Trinity Itself. Julian of Norwich seems to take this sensibility away from 
her "showings." Julian reckons that sin is the worst scourge with which 
a soul can be afflicted; that in the life to come, past sins will be publicly 
regarded as honorable battle scars. Insofar as wrecked and ruined agents 
paid the biggest price for God's cosmic projects, God might make it up to 
them by honoring them in heaven most of all.
Alternatively, it could be that one vivid Judgment Day encounter would 
be sufficient—despite our wrecked and ruined agencies—to convince us 
of Divine majesty and authority, enough to make us feel honored to have 
played any part in God's project, honored again to have had even a mo­
mentary glimpse of Who and what God really is. Such a brief confronta­
tion might be enough to compel our consent, quite apart from any hope 
of future existence and/or improvement in our concrete well-being. Some 
Calvinists might deem such a response appropriate. (I, for one, would not 
wish to dispute it.) But if this were their whole story, it would give us a 
stern form of Calvinism, indeed!
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NOTES
Vince Vitale first called my attention to Plantinga's paper, in the course 
of our vigorous and stimulating discussions of his Oxford MPhil project on 
the problem of evil. Subsequently, versions of this paper were discussed at 
philosophy colloquia at the Australian National University in Canberra, and 
at the University of New Zealand, Auckland. Helpful comments came from 
members of those departments, from Robert Merrihew Adams, and from Wil­
liam Hasker, who also shared with me a portion of his forthcoming book The 
Triumph of God Over Evil (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press 2008). I am 
grateful to them all.
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